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of alcohol. The aforementioned witnesses 
characterized Houck as uncooperative, 
combative, hostile, and belligerent. 
Another paramedic stated that Houck "ap-
peared to be intoxicated - he smelled of 
alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, all he could 
do was moan, 'he could not converse.'" Id. 
In short, it was the considered opinion of 
those in contact with Houck after the acci-
dent that Houck consumed alcohol to the 
extent that his normal coordination, facul-
ties, and physical and mental abilities were 
substantially and materially impaired. Id. 
The trial judge, in consideration of the 
foregoing evidence, submitted the case to 
the jury on the question of the "proximate 
cause of this accident ... " and "the com-
pensatory damage aspects," but had "a 
serious problem sending it on punitive 
damages." The trial judge determined that, 
as a matter of law, neither Lockett, nor 
Houck exhibited such a wanton and reck-
less disregard for human life as would per-
mit him to submit the question of punitive 
damages to the jury. Id. at 359, 539 A.2d at 
1121. 
The court of appeals, then considered 
the requisite conditions for the imposition 
of punitive damages:" 
We think that in civil automobile acci-
dent cases involving a drinking driver 
whether the driver had a wanton or 
reckless disregard for human life, in 
the operation of an automobile, is to 
be tested by a sliding scale. As the 
degree of impairment by the voluntary 
consumption of alcohol increases, the 
need for other aggravating cir-
cumstances lessens, and visa versa. 
Id. at 362, 539 A.2d at 1122. The court 
opined that the act of outrageous driving, 
as well as the act of driving after the point 
of voluntary intoxication, permitted the 
inference that the driver did not care 
whether he killed or injured others. The 
court clarified that "[ w ]hat must not be 
forgotten is that the discretion to award 
punitive damages becomes available only 
when the combination of relevant facts 
demonstrates by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the driver had a wanton or 
reckless disregard for human life." Id. at 
363, 539 A.2d at 1123. Thus, individuals 
who drive negligently, but not outrageous-
ly, and who have not consumed alcohol 
beyond the point of intoxication are not 
subject to punitive damages. Id. 
The court concluded that regarding 
Lockett's case, the judge did not err in 
withholding the issue of punitive damages 
from the jury since, as a matter of law, the 
facts were not sufficient to indicate that 
she was legally intoxicated. The court of 
appeals did hold, however, that a finding 
by the jury that Houck was intoxicated 
would have been sufficient to infer that he 
exhibited a wanton or reckless disregard 
for human life, thus justifying an award of 
punitive damages. The facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding Houck's behavior 
were sufficient to indicate outrageous con-
duct. The lower court erred, therefore, in 
keeping from the jury the issued of 
punitive damages. Id. 
The holding in Lockett v. Nast reinforces 
legislation responding to the public senti-
ment for more stringent penalties against 
those who operate motor vehicles while 
intoxicated. Thus, punitive awards will be 
made available to an increasing number of 
drunk driving victims. The court warned, 
however, that "[t]he step we take today -
recognizing that one who drinks to the 
point of becoming intoxicated and then 
undertakes the operation of a motor vehi-
cle may be found to have had a wanton dis-
regard for human life - is not an 
invitation to claim punitive damages in 
any case where negligence and drinking 
can be shown." Id. at 370, 539 A.2d at 1127 
(emphasis added). 
-Jules R. Bricker 
Legal Aid Bureau v. Bishop's Garth 
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership: JUDICIARY'S 
ABILITY TO A WARD ATTORNEY'S 
FEES LIMITED 
In Legal Aid Bureau v. Bishop's Garth 
Assocs. 75 Md. App. 214, 540 A.2d 1175 
(1988) the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland held that the Circuit Court for 
Carroll County abused its discretion by 
imposing attorney's fees against the Legal 
Aid Bureau under Md. Rule 1-341. The 
court reasoned that Legal Aid produced 
factual issues for the consideration of the 
fact-finder and that the judge was clearly 
erroneous in finding that Legal Aid was 
motivated by "bad faith" and a "lack of 
substantial justification." As a result, the 
decision by the Circuit Court for Carroll 
County was reversed. 
The case revolved around a landlord-
tenant suit brought in the District Court 
for Carroll County. In 1981, Josephine 
Brunner and Salvatore Torres leased an 
apartment at a housing project known as 
Bishop's Garth. Three years later, Bishop's 
Garth sought restitution of the premises 
by bringing an action against Brunner and 
Torres, claiming breach of their lease. 
Through their counsel, the Legal Aid 
Bureau, the tenants requested a jury trial. 
The jury found in favor of the landlord. 
When the defendants' appeal was dismiss-
ed for procedural reasons, Bishop's Garth 
filed for and was granted attorney's fees 
under Md. Rule 1-341. 
In its opinion, the court of special 
appeals drew particular attention to a 
meeting between a Legal Aid attorney and 
the managing general partner of Bishop's 
Garth. The Legal Aid lawyer requested 
photostats of other tenants' complaints 
against Brunner and Torres, along with 
pictures showing Brunner and Torres's 
children damaging the housing project's 
property. When denied this information, 
the Legal Aid attorney allegedly 
announced, "I'm sure you know that we 
can stretch this thing out. ... Based on 
that fact, don't you think it might be to 
your advantage to come to some agree-
ment with Mrs. Brunner and - save your-
self some money?" Id. at 219, 540 A.2d at 
fi77. In a footnote, the court referred to 
The Maryland Lawyers Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and the ABA Code of Pro-
fessional Conduct. They then commented 
that there was no doubt that the lawyer's 
"somewhat tactless remarks" inspired the 
plaintiffs request for punitive measures 
pursuant to Md. Rule 1-341. Id. at 219, 540 
A.2d at 1178. 
Maryland Rule 1-341, which corre-
sponds with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, declares 
In any civil action, if the court finds 
that the conduct of any party in main-
taining or defending any proceeding 
was in bad faith or without substantial 
justification, the court may require the 
offending party or the attorney advis-
ing the conduct or both of them to pay 
to the adverse party the costs of the 
proceeding and the reasonable 
expenses, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, incurred by the adverse par-
ty in opposing it. 
Rule 1-341's "bad faith" requirement 
encompasses the notion that before sanc-
tions can be applied, one must act "for 
purposes of delay." Blanton v. Equitable 
Bank, 61 Md. App. 158, 163, 485 A.2d 694 
(1985). 
The court of special appeals was disturb-
ed by the trial judge's finding that the 
tenants' indulgence in a jury trial and 
subsequent appeal was not in good faith 
and bereft of substantial justification. The 
trial judge expounded that the request for 
a jury trial was motivated by a desire for 
delay in order to unduly coerce Bishop's 
Garth to dismiss the action. Md. Rule 1-
341, however, is inapplicable to justifiable 
delays, especially if the behavior causing 
the delay concerns the assertion of a funda-
mental right. Legal Aid, 540 A.2d at 
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The appellate court referred to the Com-
ment following Md. Rule 1-341 to help 
identify whether the case was "frivolous." 
According to the Comment, filing an 
action, defense, or similar matter on a 
client's behalf is not frivolous just because 
the facts are not thoroughly supported or 
because the attorney anticipates develop-
ing important evidence via discovery 
alone. Furthermore, the lawyer need not 
believe that his client's argument eventual-
ly will succeed. On the other hand, the 
Comment asserts that an action is frivo-
lous if the client's motivation behind pur-
suing the action is to harrass or 
maliciously injure another. Additionally, a 
frivolous action includes a situation in 
which the lawyer cannot argue in good 
faith on the merits of the case or he cannot 
substantiate his case by arguing in good 
faith that the law be extended, modified, 
or reversed. Id at 221·22,540 A.2d at 1179. 
Considering case law, with an eye on the 
Comment, the court ruled that the trial 
judge was clearly erroneous in finding that 
the jury trial request was inappropriate. 
Close attention was paid to the remark 
in the trial judge's opinion that, "It became 
clear during the trial that the defendant's 
case was totally without merit." (emphasis 
added by the court). The court of special 
appeals responded, "We think it erroneous 
to determine a lack of substantial justifica-
tion from the vantage point of judicial 
hindsight because hindsight, judicial or 
otherwise, is always 20/20, irrespective of 
any astigmatism foresight may suffer." Id 
at 222, 540 A.2d at 1179. Instead, the appel-
late court found that the applicable test has 
nothing to do with hindsight. Rather, it is 
a matter of "whether the action or defense 
to it was initiated in bad faith or without 
substantial justification." Id Dent '0. Sim· 
mons reinforced the Legal Aid court's 
stance by expressing the view that the los-
ing party should not suffer the imposition 
of Rule 1-341 sanctions for introducing a 
legal theory based on imagination or dilute 
reasoning. Dent '0. Simmons, 61 Md. App. 
122, 127-28,485 A.2d 270 (1985). 
Dent molded the court's approach to a 
situation in the case sub judice in which a 
witness for the defense testified under oath 
at trial that he resided in the apartment 
rented by Brunner and Torres for at least 
five weeks. This action flagrantly violated 
the lease provision forbidding an individu-
al unnamed on the lease to stay there in 
excess of thirty days. This testimony con-
tradicted not only answers to interroga-
tories that Brunner and Torres had filed, 
but their lawyer's opening statement as 
well. Nonetheless, the court refused to 
apply Rule 1-341 sanctions to this situation 
wherein a witness testified in an unanti-
cipated manner. Remarking that it is the 
jury's role to determine which witnesses to 
believe, the court added, "the fact that the 
jury may believe one witness instead of 
others does not mean that the party whose 
witnesses were not believed defended in 
'bad faith' or 'without substantial justifica-
tion. '" Legal Aid. 75 Md. App. at 223, 540 
A.2d at 1179. 
The court went on to emphasize that 
trial counsel cannot assume the role of 
fact-finder. Relying upon Insel '0. Solomon, 
the court agreed that as a matter of law, a 
substantial justification exists for an 
action's defense as long as one reasonably 
believes that a case creates a factual issue 
for the fmder of fact. Insel '0. Solomon, 63 
Md. App. 384, 398, 491 A.2d 963 (1985). 
Thus, Legal Aid more clearly defines the 
scope of Md. Rule 1-341. The court reiter-
ates that the rule is not meant to prevent 
individuals with causes supported by frag-
ile or imaginative legal theories from hav-
ing their day in court because they fear the 
imposition of sanctions. Instead, "no one 
who avails himself or herself of the right to 
seek redress in a Maryland court of law 
should be punished merely for exercising 
that right." Legal Aid. 75 Md. App. at 224, 
540 A.2d at 1180. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, therefore, limits the 
judiciary's ability to award attorney's fees 
by encouraging more circumscribed and 
judicious utilization of Rule 1-341. 
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